April 7 — Day 408 — Offensive leaks from the Americans

Hi FB!

Before I get to one of the more epic American security failures of about the last half-decade, a video of wildlife at the front. Also, this is a single-topic post, so if you’re reading this to find out what’s going on at the front, don’t bother, there’s no information about that here.

Well that was timely. Less than a week after this review speculated in detail about the Ukrainian offensive, the US/Ukraine Joint Chief of Staff in a pretty epic OPSEC failure found parts of what very much looks like a secret power point slide briefing about that very subject, all over the internet.

In general, it looks like someone on the distribution list for the briefing printed four pages, photographed those pages with a smart phone, and that “content” eventually found its way to the internet. This is not it was an American who was the spy, but, the materials were for American general officer consumption and their confidentiality’s protection was, of course, an American responsibility. This is also not to say, the four pages in the public domain was the limit to what was compromised.

There is enough detail there — and frankly the front is pretty static with both sides waiting for the UAF to get all its ducks in a row for the offensive to kick off — to pick through this US-Ukrainian security failure and try and understand the present and hopefully divine the future a little better. But one must always bear in mind, it’s not — yet — absolutely confirmed the leaked documents are authentic.

As a matter of fact, the Ukrainians in the form of Presidential Administration spokesman Myhailo Podalyak told Reuters, today, it’s all a Russian fake to undermine confidence in the upcoming offensive.

I am skeptical. My reaction is that if they are faked then they are some of the best fakes I’ve seen in a while and dramatically well above the normal standard of Russian faked information.

Also, I’m not really clear how Podolyak’s argument about trying to harm allied morale holds water, because effectively the papers testify to a very substantial Ukrainian counterattack force being trained, armed, and ready for bear at the end of April. If someone can explain to me how news of a corps-sized Ukrainian force with 800+ armored personnel carriers, 350+ tanks, 90+ self-propelled heavy artillery pieces, and 90+ self-propelled artillery pieces, all available for commitment to combat at the beginning of May, is a Russian trick that will undermine American and Ukrainian morale, I really would like to hear it.

I’m inclined to assume the documents are real but am glad to consider evidence they’re not. Clearly (final two images) in some places on some Telegram channels the images appear to have been manipulated to make it appear that Ukrainian personnel losses, effectively in the view of the Americans, heavily outweigh Russian losses. One can argue about scale, but with even Russian propagandists admitting their losses are heavier than the Ukrainians but with excuses (we’re attacking, we don’t have NATO equipment, we don’t use artillery against civilian structures, etc.), I think it’s safe to say that at least some images have been doctored. The question is, of course, what else has been manipulated and what has not.

And even if the dox were real, they were manipulated. No one — not even the Russians — really believe Ukrainian losses are four times higher than Russian losses, but the beauty of Photoshop is you don’t have to care about reality, you can create it

Close-up of the casualty numbers as they actually were briefed, always assuming the briefing dox are authentic. Does the USG really think RF losses are 25 percent of Ukrainian estimates? How do we match that with verbal Pentagon official estimates, which seem to mostly put Russian losses at maybe 60 percent of Ukrainian estimates? It wouldn’t be important except, of course, this is what decision-makers are being briefed. (Most likely)

Ultimately, the arguments for taking the dox at face value are pretty strong, so, with those qualifications out of the way, and with the recommendation that if you’re really interested just take a look at the documents yourself and make your own conclusions, here’s my two cents’:

Loss estimates — Assuming that the briefing estimates 35–43,000 Russian KIA from start of war through Feb. 2023, and 16–17,000 Ukrainian KIA over the same period, then we are left with the question as to how what amounts to an internal US military estimate is roughly four times lower than what the Ukrainians are estimating about Russian losses, and anywhere from three to six times lower than what military analysts looking at Ukraine typically guess. I suspect that the US numbers are confirmed killed with “confirmed” meaning some combination of US technical data collection and processing came up with the numbers, for instance, satellite overflights of military cemateries and new grave counts. But I really don’t know. One thing is for sure: just because the US government estimates something doesn’t make it automatically the best estimate, they make mistakes just like everyone else.

How much force seems to be coming — In general, these documents match previous estimates including by this review: an armored counterattack force of 9–12 brigades almost certainly that will be used more as an exploitation and fluid battle force, than a breakthrough force. I think it’s pretty likely a few of the better long-serving regular brigades who’ve developed strong fighting reputations, and who appear not to be on the line or with limited troops on the line, will also participate in the mobile part of the offensive. There are more than a few brigades Zaluzhny can choose from, and if Defense Minister Reznikov’s blabbing the day before yesterday was accurate, the counterattack will in fact be launched on several axes. But now we have the identification of at least 9 brigades in the exploitation force, and of those three — the 46th, the 47th, and the 82nd — are corroborated by other open sources.

Assuming this is real, this is a photograph of a Top Secret page of a slide presentation for US senior military officers involved in supporting Ukraine. I am fairly sure the top secret rating is because of the shaded areas which are places US intelligence has detected something emitting radar, comms, or some other kind of electronic signature

How the Ukrainian force is organized — We don’t know if the way these units seem to be formed up are actually what the Ukrainians plan to do or, possibly, the best guess of some Pentagon officers that had to put together the power point. However, armies love cookie cutters and the briefing slides have all the earmarks of a staff system trying to make sense and logic out of a huge number of moving and not always well-coordinated parts. I suspect most UAF colonels would laugh at the equipment load-outs and say something like “The UAF is never, ever that organized”.

But, even if it is aspiration, what we see is the UAF creating seven brigades which are a callidescope/cornucopia of all manner of newer anti-mine like the MaxxPro, and older armored personnel carriers and M-113, and two brigades — the 47th and the 82nd — into which will be crammed all the high-end infantry fighting vehicles (Bradley, Stryker and Marder). There is also a contradiction: the 47th is pretty active posting information about itself and they clearly operate BMPs, while the leaked documents say the 47th doesn’t have BMPs. Disconnects like that left aside, again always assuming the leaked documents reflect Ukrainian plans, then clearly, if and when the breakthrough takes place, the tip of the breakthrough spear will be those two brigades, that’s where the most direct fire firepower is concentrated.

According to the leaked dox, the Ukrainians tend to build a brigade this way: three infantry battalions riding in about 90 armored vehicles, one tank battalion with about 30 tanks, and one artillery battalion with about 12 towed howitzers and 12 self-propelled howitzers. I am still not convinced the Leopards and Challenger tanks will be made part of these maneuver brigades, but, for the record, the leaked dox clearly show that they will.

Another organizational observation with operational implications is, I have a great deal of respect for the UAF but maneuvering even a single brigade that size is probably outside the experience of anyone in the UAF, and to make this offensive come off General Zaluzhny needs to get literally dozens of brigade- and battalion-level commanders, and their staffs, to execute effective offensive operations and avoiding typical bonehead errors like ordering armored assaults into kill zones or minefields, getting the food and ammo forward in a fluid fight where it’s not always clear where the good guys are, or shelling one’s own people. Yes they have been training in Germany but getting things like that right in war isn’t easy, just ask the Russians.

If this is real, then this is the most-detailed description of General Zaluzhny’s counterattack force available anywhere except inside the Ukrainian army general staff. It is not clear if all the equipment assignments are correct, in several cases other sources confirm them but not in all. Note that this is a counterattack force heavy on infantry carriers and not oversupplied with artillery and tnaks

NATO special operations guys in Ukraine — I’ve had people tell me “definitely US operatives are in Ukraine”, and I’ve agreed politely, but thanks to this security leak we now have a better estimate: 14 Green Beret/special forces dudes (a/k/a one “A” team). There also appear to be 84 other NATO special ops guys in Ukraine mixed from Britain, Lithuania, France, and a single guy from Holland. I doubt they’re allowed to go anywhere near the front lines, but I also know that in a war like this guys in special ops tend to figure out ways to do what they want rather than what they’re ordered. Anyway, it will be interesting to watch the fall out in western media over the “proof” — and remember, Podolyak says it’s a fake — of NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine.

Another interesting page — note the NATO soldier types listed as on the ground in Ukraine, even though according to their governments there are no soldiers on the ground in Ukraine. There’s even one Dutch special forces guy, bet he’d be a good guy to buy a beer for.

Secret vs. Top Secret — We don’t know how many pages of this briefing were compromised, but it’s kind of hard to believe that whoever it was that smart phone photographed the printed slide pages chose only those pages to pass on, and we can take it as a given that the owners of the briefing must assume that the whole thing, and its distribution chain, is compromised. The very fact an internal investigation was reported to be in progress effectively the moment the dox hit the public domain, very much smells like the Americans knew internally about the leak for a while, but now with news of the leak, effectively leaked, so to speak, the official line has become “an investigation is in progress”. Which lends some credence to Podolyak’s argument the release of the dox was intended to sow discord and mistrust among NATO states, but doesn’t much support his claim the dox aren’t real.

Anyway, another indicator the dox could be real is this small detail: of the four pages that have hit the internet, three were listed “secret” and one was listed “top secret”, and the difference between the two clearly is that the top secret slide has some map data showing where “emitters” are located. These are radars and communications nodes and the information — from both sides of the line of contact, by the way — is the electronic data that these Global Hawk flights and other US spy aircraft have been hoovering up from airspace near Ukraine for months. It is textbook, US military/government security policy to rate electronically-collected data usable intelligence top secret, meaning this is another indicator either the dox are real or the person who faked them really knows USG security procedures.

Assuming the data as displayed is accurate, then we can now say with some certainly several things that we guessed at before:

1. The Russians are just as concerned about an attack from Kherson towards Crimea by the shortest route, the fact that the Ukrainians would have to bridge the Dnipro River — and that would not be easy, it’s like the Mississippi — to do it. This could be the Russians knowing Ukrainian intentions better than most, or, Russian nervousness about threats to Crimea.

2. The Russians are more than a little concerned that the Ukrainians also/instead could try and cross the river at Nova Kakhkovka/Energodar.

3. The Russians expect a big battle, perhaps the biggest battle, to take place around Tokmak on the Zaporizhia-Melitpol road.

4. The Russians are betting the Ukrainians will not attempt to cross the Dnipro between Kherson and Nova Kakhovka, and further, they are not overly concerned about potential UAF seaborne moves west of Kherson to the Kinburn spit.

5. That the UAF has artillery dominance in this sector is pretty well documented, so, General Zaluzhny and his staff have to at least be thinking about getting force to the left bank of the Dnipro in that area. The logical units for this would be 73rd Training Detachment (Ukraine’s amphibious spetsnaz specialists), and 35th and/or 36th Marine Brigade. It is also worth noting that about a month back 82nd Assault Brigade — who according to the leaked documents may turn out to be the single most firepower-heavy brigade on the entire front — was practicing water obstacle crossings.