September 26 — Day 215 — Your questions about Kharkiv region and other stuff

Hi FB!

I’m back from a swing through Kharkiv region during which I went to, among other places, Izium, Kozachy Lopan’ and Kupiansk. The primary focus was volunteers helping out both civilians and military in sector, but no worries, access was good and there was plenty to see on all sorts of subjects.

Some of you clearly are curious about developments outside the Kharkiv sector and I’m glad to offer my two cents’, but, I wasn’t in Donbass or the south this time.

Also, thanks to each and every one of you for taking the time to send a question, it really helps to see people are reading about Ukraine and are curious about what’s happening.

Q: Шон Алмейда — Does it seem to you that there was a lot of fighting as the Russians withdrew, or was it just a race to gtfo and not much rearguard action?

A: Yes and no. In general terms, where the recent Kharkiv offensive is concerned, I did no small amount of driving in the area of breakthrough, up to and including the Oskil Reservoir. I wasn’t in Balakliya but I was in a lot of towns and villages east and north of there. From what I saw, repeatedly, there was an RF checkpoint of maybe platoon strength on the east side of said town or village, and about half the time the bunkers were shot up and there was trash all over the place like there had been a battle in the sense that whoever was manning the checkpoint got blasted out of it. The other half of the time, and this isn’t science, it looked like the checkpoint had just been abandoned. I certainly didn’t see Battle of Kursk fields filled with burnt-out vehicles, anywhere.

My guess is the UAF broke the RF line in several places and then it was off to the races eastward, with the qualification that in some places the RF tried to slow down the UAF by fighting for a checkpoint for a while.

Q: Jonas Skovrup Christensen and Revi Unni — Would welcome comments on impressions from conversations with local population regarding time under occupation and the liberation itself; soldiers’ views on the offensive that liberated most of Kharkiv region and what you expect to happen based on conversations and observations. What is the reaction to the “mobilisation”?

A: Locals where I was, fairly close and sometimes on the fighting line, generally said the Russian troops looted fairly frequently but otherwise mostly kept to themselves. One shopkeeper lady outside Izyum swore up and down to me — because I told her it just couldn’t be true — that the very favorite thing for the Russians to steal was a ceramic toilet. She seemed absolutely serious even though she knew how funny it sounded. No one reported troops out of control like in Bucha, but, everyone reported that once the Russians occupied a place the Russian police would start hunting down former military, officials unwilling to collaborate and the like, haul them off, and sometimes the detainees didn’t come back. I saw the mass grave out of Izyum and to me it seemed pretty clear that at least some of the dead were buried there after questioning and so torture.

People were taking liberation as a positive thing, but their lives are so tough that it’s hard to be joyous. There are villages without water and electricity for weeks, and homes open to the weather, with people living in them, for months. There are plenty of “liberated” places still under fire. So the people’s priority is just dealing with surviving, which comes down to food, heat and shelter. (Most) everyone thinks the UAF is great, but no one is dancing in the streets, day-to-day stuff is difficult in ways most of us really can’t imagine.

On mobilization, among the civilians where I was, it’s a non-issue. I guess people think that’s something for the UAF to take care of.

Among the soldiers I talked to, the reaction was about 50 percent “well, Russia thinks it can do lots of things it turns out it is incapable of doing”, and 50 percent “Let them come, we’ll kill them like the ones before, and the faster we kill them the quicker the war will end.”

Q: Roy Cauldery — Heard the guy leading the charge got wounded? A major general? Is he ok? Guessing the moral with the UKR troops is good……how about RF forces? Is the line collapsing? What’s the views of the guys on the ground about mobilisation? How are they dealing with Pows?

A: On the general, I don’t know. On RF force morale, no direct information, but from what I read it’s going to Hell. On UAF morale, their tails are up, they know they’re winning, and they want people to know what they’ve done.

Q: Lwabya Eric — How is Ukraine tackling the issue of man power shortages among the foot soldiers are their recruits under training to boost this man power shortage and moral

A: I don’t know of a Ukrainian manpower shortage and I haven’t seen any evidence, excepting the battles around Severodonetsk in June and July, that there ever was a real manpower shortage. As to morale, it seems very good, troops wave, they joke, they’re fully kitted out, their columns are holding together, there seem to be all manner of pickup trucks and 4WDs for them to tool about from here to there.

On morale, from what I saw, morale is good.

Q: John Vax — Did you witness an active Russian counterattack on the East side of Kupiansk? Is your feeling another Ukrainian offensive is likely before the rainy season/winter? Are the trophies the Russians left for the Ukrainians in Izyum as bountiful as advertised?

A: On Kupiansk, with the qualification I wasn’t actually on a hill watching the Russian ground forces advance, yes, I witnesses that.

When I was in the town for several hours at several locations, there was all manner of UAF artillery, tank (I think) and mortar fire, some incoming RF mortar and rocket fire, and the general view among everyone — civilians, soldiers, volunteers, police — etc. was that the Russians are trying to hold the east/left bank of the Oskil and committing troops in the attempt, but the UAF is grinding them up. When I was there the weight of UAF fire was, I would say, my judgement, four times what the RF was sending back.

When I left the town in the afternoon (this was Sep. 23) I saw this heading the opposite way to the firing line: One Polish T-72 tank, six (!) Bucephalus armored personnel carriers, a BM-21 Grad, an MTLB with a ZSU-23 on top of it, another MTLB with some kind of crane/engineering thing on top of it, and several trucks. Next morning there were reports that the UAF had made a ground attack against the RF positions in Kupiansk, kicked the RF out in several places but there was more digging out to be done. I also know that on Sep. 24 the north-east edge of the town was gray zone but under RF observation and fire.

On the possible UAF offensive, I haven’t caught up enough to decide what I think about all the reports around Lyman, but, it seems pretty clear to me the UAF attacks hard either when they see a lever that can break a Russian defense line, or when there are easy pickings.

On trophies, on the roads I drove on, all we saw were hulks, things that were so burnt out and smashed their only value was scrap metal.

Q: Michael Forbes — A practical question: how difficult it is to actually move around those liberated parts of Kharkiv Oblast? I don’t mean in terms of checkpoints/military presence/etc, but on a more practical level — how are fuel supplies (to civilians), is there anything resembling public transport, etc?

A: There is no fuel available, basically, anywhere where the power is out, and more generally it’s hard to find a working fuel station much beyond Kharkiv. In and around Kharkiv, no problem, the fuel availability was impressive. But beyond Chuguev either have a plan to get back or carry fuel with you. There is public transport where the civil authorities are functioning and power works, again, Chuguev seemed to be the rough cut-off although I didn’t check it closely. Places on the front line like Kupiansk and Kozachy Lopan just have nothing, you get in and out by your or someone else’s vehicle, ride a bike or walk. No public transport. Even in Izium power is out in a lot of places and phone coverage only works, I am told, a few places in the center. I never got a phone signal in Izium except once when I was on a big hill overlooking the city from the south.

Q: Alan Himmer — Any impression of composition of the opposing force that pulled out of the area — whether the forces that left were regular ARF troops, “People’s Republic” volunteers, Chechens, Wagner PMC, and in what % combination ? I’ve got the impression that the northern theatre above and NE of Kharkiv was mostly normal ARF units, whereas the Donetsk salient was more Chechens and Wagner, and Kherson in south was again mostly normal ARF troops. Can you add what are the thoughts on the Chechens? Are they as good as they want everyone to believe or is it just hype?

A: It was mixed. In Kozachy Lopan’, for instance, the locals told me Russian troops drove through first during the first days of the invasion, but the occupation troops were Ossetians. In Izium, it seems like there were ethnic Russian troops stationed there but when the cops raided peoples’ homes, there were Chechen paramilitary police along with them. More than one villager pointed out a house or a series of houses that, he said, Chechens had looted. I saw and heard nothing about Wagner fighters. UAF soldiers and media make clear that a lot of the front-line troops initially hit in the offensive were conscripts from LPR who mostly just wanted to surrender.

On the Chechens’ fighting ability, in this war, the prevailing view in the UAF seems to be that Chechens are excellent at fighting civilians but tend to die in droves if put up against regular troops.

That said, some of the toughest fighting men I have ever personally seen were Chechens, some of them walked wounded, carrying a buddy, across the Causasus Mountains…and then they went back to Russia to kill (their words not mine) the godless infidel Russians some more.

But that was back in the early 2000s.

Q: Mark Hillier — I read a significant amount of information regarding the transfer of M113, yet have seen very little information on there actual use. Are these being retained in reserve or in the rear area’s due to their limited protection.

A: I have no first-hand information but videos of Dutch M-113s operating in the south have surfaced. My guess is they were handed out to re-equip entire battalions at 30 vehicles a crack, so unless some trooper in the unit decides to post an image or a video, we’ll get the impression the vehicles aren’t there.

Q: Ólavur Kjølbro — Should the UAF have pushed further towards or into Luhansk? …or did the RF have strongholds east of the Oskil river?

A: In general, my view is the UAF knows what it’s doing. They want their country back and they’re not going to be lazy, but, if they can get the job done by waiting for explosives and metal to do the work, then they absolutely will wait and save lives. I assume they advanced as fast and as far as they could without risking serious casualties, and looking at the map, that meant not advancing out from underneath anti-aircraft and artillery support.

I assume the RF is trying to build strongpoints but as always the critical bit is the men holding those positions

Q: Alexey Ladokhin — My question is about Lyman. Does it look like a sign that war is becoming positional again? Will Ukraine have enough reserves to push further to Luhansk oblast if they capture Lyman? I am very interested in hearing from an independent source.

A: Sorry, the price of going to the field where the phones don’t work, and seeing things with your eyes, is that you get really behind on what’s going on elsewhere. But in general, it looks pretty clear to me that the Ukrainians are back into “gradual attrition” mode for the time being.

Q: Guy Yosef — Kharkiv region is on the front with Russia, there are many well protected Russian air bases close to this front. We didn’t see Russia trying to stop the Ukrainian counterattack. Ukraine air defense is that strong?

A: It seems that way to me, and I read that on Sunday (I think) the UAF knocked down something like four RF combat jets. The combat formation I saw outside of Kupiansk definitely had close in air defense with it (although, 23mm autocannon are pretty popular for carving up manned positions as well)

Q: Lars Linnet — Iranian loitering ammunition, i have read some reported case, but is it your impression that it will change anything or is it another wonder waffe from the Russians like the “terminator” tank

A: All I can say at this point is that the American blogosphere seems a lot more impressed with these drones than the UAF. The Ukrainians say they’re pretty easy to shoot down. We’ll see who’s right I guess.

Q: Stuart Astley — any idea on ukainian troop numbers trained or still in training and which countries are doing this ? i know uk are doing this .

A: Not really. All I know for sure is that the UAF is sending troops to be trained as fast as they can and that the numbers of total troops trained by NATO seem to vary from between 5,000 and 8,000, depending on the source.

I think it’s important to remember that a lot of UAF units, particularly the light infantry and some of the territorial defense, arguably are already to something like NATO standard, because they’ve got five to seven months of combat experience in this specific war.

At this point I would be willing to bet that some of the better UAF formations, for instance 92nd Mech or 25th Airborne, or maybe Kraken or Azov SSO, would be MORE combat effective and take less casualties on the standard missions they run in sector, than a comparable NATO unit trying it for the first time.

Q: Erik Granberg — The wisdom of the Swedish news feeds is that rain has slowed down the Ukrainian offensive. Has mud season started, and what effect do you anticipate when it does?

A: Please tell the Swedish news feeds that I personally inspected road and off-road conditions in Kharkiv sector for several days and mud season is without question upon us. I would also say, it has slowed the Ukrainian offensive only in the sense that if they are moving heavy vehicles through low ground, it’s going to be more difficult. But there are lots of roads and the key to stopping an attack is holding key intersections and dominating large areas of ground by fire. If you can knock out the other guy’s ability to observe and smash some of his checkpoints, fast movement is definitely possible.

Q: Lucian Quatermass — My question is regarding whether there’s been any noticeable degradation of the quality of Russian regular forces due to continuing morale or training issues? Are the Wagner, PMC units suffering any degradation?

A: In general yes. The worst off seem to be the civilians conscripted into units in the LPR and DPR, it seems like almost everyone assumes those troops are close to worthless. But a thing to remember is that this conscripted militia doesn’t seem to have anything bigger than AKs, which are not too helpful if the UAF comes at them with armored vehicles or artillery.

Q: R Pierce Thomas — Curious what the strategy is to hold the territory recaptured in the north? That is a lot of ground to hold. Will the UAF focus on holding key villages and logistics centers or attempt a cohesive line across the territory? Any word on progress in the south or is it a siege to wait it out while Kherson strangles?

Are there any Ukrainian made armaments being used in the fighting? Have seen occasional female UAF’s in the reporting…what percentage of the forces are they?

A: On holding strategy, as above, road checkpoints and dominate ground by observation and fire. As few troops in the forward line as possible, reserves in a second line of villages.

The most common Ukraine-made armament by far has to be a WOG 40mm grenade rigged to drop off of a civilian quadrocopter. It seems like every recon platoon has some drone geek among them who loves to play air force, and try and drop grenades into RF foxholes and open vehicle hatches. There are tons of videos.

I would be remiss if I didn’t also mention that somehow the Ukrainians figured out how to fire a US Harm missile from a Soviet MiG-29 jet fighter. (Although it seems possible the Romanians or Czechs or someone helped them out on this)

Q: Andrew Craig-Bennett — I cannot think of anything that I would ask you about your recent trip that would not prejudice Ukrainian security, so I’ll ask about the harvest, instead and about how well grain is being stored and is moving. Thanks!

A: I saw harvesters on the move, most wheat fields harvested, but corn not yet. I saw some train cars and trucks with grain going somewhere. As to the size of the harvest I can’t say, but in general the war seems not to have stopped farming in Kharkiv region.

Q: Mark Miller — Hi Stefan, interesting area to visit and I’m looking forward to reading about it. Q — in your opinion, are there any other areas in NE / Donbas that are “ripe” for UAF to focus on next with the prospect of liberation before winter sets in? Thanks

A: I don’t know about “ripe”, but UAF control of the towns Sviatove and Starobilsk would make it pretty much impossible for the RF to supply Donbass positions from the north. Also, at some point the UAF has to start working its way southeast towards Kherson via Nova Kakhovka

Q: Walter Cruciani — Any news about the Russian Black sea fleet ?

A: Past last week’s news that the RF pulled all its submarines out of Sevastopol, probably to avoid getting whacked by Ukraine’s mystery missile, no.

Q: Graham Read — Based on what you’ve seen up close of the terrain, the defences and the offensive capabilities, what’s going to be the impact of a few tens of thousands of poorly equipped infantry in this sector? I assume with an immensely long front, if the lines are porous then more infantry could be effective. Do you think the Russian leadership is learning lessons and thinking how to effectively utilise these troops?

How have the UA troops you met reacted to recent successes? Is there a hunger for more or it’s more sober, so the need to consolidate gains and ensure supply lines are in place? Do you see the UA doing more sweeping land grabs before the winter?

Is it fair to say the Luhansk/Donetsk will be far tougher as there are years of defences built up, and the local population is apathetic to a change in government.

A: On the toughness of defenses, as above, the key bit is the people manning the defenses. My intuition says that if the UAF manages to shift to mobile warfare anywhere in the Donbass we could see the war’s first mass surrenders, as most of the defensive positions around Donetsk and Luhansk have to be manned by the most unmotivated of conscripts.

On the impact of the mobilization, as above, the UAF guys I talked to had questions as to how much of it was just Russian lies and propaganda, and they all — but of course they were talking to a foreign reporter, what else would they say — said that if more Russians came they would kill them too.

Regarding infantry and light infantry, one thing this war has shown is that, like tanks, dismounted infantry has its uses, but, the idea that individuals or any single weapon system wins wars is silly and military organizations that get overly fixated on the individual warrior, or any single weapons system, are probably setting themselves up to get pummeled when it comes to combined arms fighting.

Special forces snipers, bayonet experts, super tanks and fighter aces have won exactly how many battles and captured how many villages in this war?

There is an absolute need for infantry with the normal range of dismounted operations skills, but, between fast armored vehicles and drone-controlled artillery, any army pinning its hopes on a lot of infantrymen and nothing else, is going to achieve little need a whole lot of body bags.

To be clear: skilled infantry is critical although by itself not a battle winner, and individual infantrymen no matter how skilled are worth little unless part of a combined arms team. Unskilled infantry is basically a drain on resources at best, and most likely walking corpses.

Q: Anne Keller-Smith and Mihály Oláh — How are the people there? Will they be able to rebuild? Are there any people remaining? What is the condition of these towns?

A: As above, things for people in villages and towns on the line are tough and primitive. Not as bad as Mariupol during the siege, but clearly not overly far from that. Some towns are badly damaged. The destruction in Izyum is shocking, I hope to have a link up showing some of that in the next day or two. In pretty much all places the majority has fled but a minority, generally the poor and the aged, remain. Reconstruction is absolutely possible, in Bucha for instance they just opened a shiny new grocery store that would be slick and upscale in a Seattle suburb. But the key to reconstruction is safety, or more simply, it has to be out of RF artillery range. A corollary to that is that the grid and roads to the town or village have to be out of RF artillery range as well.

It’s hard to communicate how stark the difference in living standards is between a place that has electricity and phone coverage, and a place sometimes less than a couple of kilometers away, that doesn’t yet.

Q: Matthew Bergstrom — What has been the use and effectiveness of the US supplies suicide drones? I believe there are two models and one might be called switchblade, which was recently replenished.

A: I don’t know except I’ve heard next to nothing about the Switchblades in operation and I read from time to time the anti-vehicle Switchblade isn’t even being manufactured yet. My inclination is that all the noise we heard about Switchblade a while back was just advertising or propaganda.

Q: Rob Suss — Any insights into the counter-battery fight and also thoughts on what is needed over the next few weeks, compared to bloggers demands for Leopard 2s/ATACMs/F-16s etc

A: Nothing that I haven’t said before. If we look at Politico it seems like the Zelensky administration now is trying to shake down NATO for more anti-aircraft weapons. But in general, it seems pretty clear that the UAF wants and needs artillery more mobile than towed artillery, with all due respect to the very useful and at least once battle-winning M777. I think the best proof is to look at the first NATO-standard howitzers the Ukrainians actually decided to buy: Polish Krabs. I assume this was due to price and the Poles’ ability to deliver in months not years, unlike some Teutonic nations famous for military hardware I could mention.

Q: Jeff Mitzel

1. Are you seeing cqptured Russian armor put to use in units, or are they being sent to the rear?! Same for the ammo, and is this a game changer from earlier reports that the UAF didn’t have ammo in abundance?!

A: Basically no. The ammo captured seems to have helped but it’s not like I’m hearing about bottomless reserves for the artillery units. I’ve seen plenty of reports of captured RF tanks operated by the Ukrainians but never seen one personally. I certainly have seen all manner of captured Russian equipment, down towards Mykolaiv once I saw a whole supply base full of Russian equipment. The supply of 155mm seems solid, no complaints that I’ve seen.

2. If the captured stuff, what do you see them most excited about?! Munitions and artillery rounds?!

A: I would say it’s without doubt the T-90U, but that’s probably more for “gee whiz” and embarrassing Putin, than actual practical use.

3.What foreign artillery and ammo are you seeing?! There’s such a mix at this point?! Are you seeing Krabs in one geography and Caesars in another?! M777's?! Excaliber munitions?! And what does the UAF seem to embrace most and are eager to get more of?!

A: As noted above, when spending their own money the Ukrainians picked Polish Krabs. As to guns themselves I have yet to see a single foreign gun actually in action, although seen a couple of them moving around. There are videos of basically everything moving or shooting or both in the internet, including Excalibur. You are quite right it’s a crazy mix, I think I read Ukraine at the moment is operating eight (!) different systems firing the 155mm shell.

4.Are you seeing new’ish recruits added to strengthen units before they were sent in on the counter offensive?!

A: Not enough information to say but trust me I’m very curious to find out

5.What surprised you most as you did this tour?!

A: The degree to which volunteers and volunteer-purchased and delivered food and materials are part of the supply system to regular army units. There is, effectively, a giant volunteer-run supply chain servicing what looks like every combat unit in the country, parallel with the army/government supply system. Some of the volunteer-supposed units that are supposedly territorial defense/local fighters, are demonstrably better-equipped than similar regular army units. That’s the exception, but still, wow.

Q: Jim Wilock — After the big counterattack took Izium and Kupiansk so quickly I read that they were moving on Lyman. But now it’s been well over a week and they are still reported to be “moving on Lyman”. Is lack of progress more due to the need to regroup and re-supply, or due to Russian defenses being much stronger there? Did you get the impression that one more big push would take place before winter sets in?

A: See above. I think the UAF policy is push but limit casualties, and time isn’t a problem.

Q: Douglas Healy — What is the general point of view on the sham referendums taking place? and is it in anyway going to effect the current push to get all Russians out of Ukrainian?

A: See above, the UAF seems to think it’s pointless and just hot air.

Q: Trevor Baird — Videos show the detritus at Russian positions — would that be the way they are — because they have left in a hurry or results of Ukrainian forces as they take over — how do Ukrainian positions look! Tidy soldiers makes for a happy army

A: I wouldn’t call them tidy by NATO standards. You see lots of water bottle propped against things, maybe grenades piled up on a parapet, ammo boxes lying around, and trash that doesn’t really affect fighting capacity but certainly doesn’t look neat.

However, the holes they dig are deep, and you see shovels everywhere. There is a saying in the UAF: “If you want to live, dig”. Overall, the Ukrainians make holes fast, they make them all the time, and they make them without being told to. They don’t complain and they don’t tell each other real infantry would be doing something cool like patrolling. They understand, intuitively and deeply, that for them to do their part in the battle, they need to be ready to ride out artillery, and if artillery catches you out of a hole at best you are going to be a casualty.

For all their tidiness, frankly, even the best NATO units suck at digging in, compared to the Ukrainians, in my view.

Q: Roger de Rijke — What are the expectations of the Ukranian people/soldiers where it will stop in the short term (mud/winter), and what do you think?

A: I think it has sort of stopped in the sense that no one is expecting fast movement or major attacks at the moment. The assumption is they will come eventually, when the time is right. No one seems to be particularly thinking about mud, there are all sorts of ways to deal with that. There is more thought going towards cold and winter, I’ve seen quartermasters ordering winter boots and extra socks, efforts to stock up on generators and fuel, that sort of thing.